

# **Culture and Effects-based Operations in an Insurgency**

**A Monograph**



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## **ABSTRACT**

CULTURE AND EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS IN AN INSURGENCY by MAJ Michael L. Davidson, United States Army, 55 pages.

Despite its domination of conventional warfare the United States military finds itself in a quagmire concerning the unconventional fight in Iraq. Never a strong suit of the United States military, the insurgency is testing both the patience and the will of the military. Fighting both national and foreign insurgents, understanding the violence against the populace of Iraq and American forces have many questioning: what type of people perform and endure these types of violent acts? Therefore, to understand insurgency and the population/environment that breeds it, one has to understand culture. Cultural factors influence the genesis, lifetime, and demise of an insurgency. In other words, without understanding the culture one will not understand an insurgency.

Effects-based operations (EBO) are the new methodology that the Department of Defense (DOD) has embarked upon during its transformation. Its potential to utilize and maximize all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) to shape or change the behavior of both foe and friend alike to achieve national policy aims has many considering EBOs' effectiveness as a modern tool against the insurgency in Iraq. Can EBO currently account for the cultural factors in Iraq and leverage the synergistic power of the coordinated elements of national power to defeat an insurgency? The potential for EBO to accomplish this task exists, yet the reality of it doing so still remains in question. The main limitations for EBO are the lack of a common lexicon and interagency coordination.

The DOD should take key steps to improve the capability to effectively use EBO in the national security strategy and to defeat insurgency. For example, developing a common lexicon usable by all the elements of national power and educating senior leadership and interagency organizations on the capability and methodology of EBO could improve the overall effectiveness of EBO in serving the national defense and defeating an insurgency.

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## CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION

When it comes to conventional warfare the United States has no peer in the world. The decisive victory in Operation DESERT STORM and the rapid destruction of Iraqi conventional forces in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM demonstrated the unparalleled prowess that the United States military possesses when conducting conventional warfare. The United States military has, however, displayed less success when it comes to fighting unconventional wars. For example, the Vietnam conflict and the current operations in Iraq display the difficulty American forces face when fighting against an unconventional foe. Current and future enemies of the United States understand the American military's weakness at fighting unconventional wars and will purposely engage American forces in this type of warfare.<sup>1</sup> If insurgency warfare is the future trend of tactics used by America's opponents, then it leads to an essential question—how does the American military prepare for success in these types of operations?

Historically, American forces have demonstrated success when modeling a conventional foe, but it has difficulty when modeling an unconventional foe using insurgency warfare tactics. An essential area often overlooked by the military is understanding the enemy's culture. A major criticism of American forces in the Vietnam conflict was the ignorance and misunderstanding of the enemy's culture.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, the military has been slow to change. Recently, Admiral (retired) Arthur Cebrowski, Director of Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) stated, "Even today, the knowledge of one's enemy and his culture and society may be more important than knowledge of his order of battle."<sup>3</sup> Hence, today culture is being viewed as a key factor to understand an enemy and an insurgency.

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<sup>1</sup> Melissa Applegate, *Preparing for Asymmetry: As Viewed Through The Lens of Joint Vision 2020* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2001), 1-5.

<sup>2</sup> Douglas Pike, *PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986), 54-55.

<sup>3</sup> Keith J. Costa, "Cebrowski: DOD Planners Need to Focus On Understanding the Enemy," *Inside the Pentagon* (Washington, DC: Inside Washington Publishers, November 2004). Available online at <http://www.oft.osd.mil/index.cfm/> (accessed 13 November 2004).

Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, United States' national leadership has understood the importance of transforming the Department of Defense (DOD) to meet new security threats. The DOD's transformation has not been limited to restructuring units, increasing services' expeditionary capabilities, and investing in future weapon systems, but has also looked into examining and redefining the way the military thinks about, plans and conducts full-spectrum operations. As a result, the concept that has emerged and is viewed as a methodology for military operations is effects-based operations (EBO).

This study looks at culture and its importance in defining the enemy. What is culture? This monograph answers that question by examining culture from a military perspective. The primary focus for this perspective is DOD writings, and official joint publications, and doctrine from different services. Next, the writings of past and present authors are examined to obtain their definitions of culture. The prevalent and recurring ideas and themes from those writings are extracted to develop a common definition of culture that establishes factors to judge whether an event is culturally related or not.

Subsequently, this monograph asks and answers the question: What is an insurgency? This paper seeks to answer that question by examining definitions and explanations of past and present experts in the field of insurgency, namely Mao Tse-tung and Bard O'Neill. Mao's and O'Neill's models and definitions of insurgency exemplify the key elements of an insurgency. Next the cultural factors will be applied to the insurgency key factors to determine the *cultural factors of an insurgency*.

After identifying the cultural factors of an insurgency, this study examines EBOs. An EBO is defined utilizing the most recent writings from DOD, United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), and various military services. There is one essential question to be examined about EBO: "Is EBO currently comprehensive enough to account for the cultural factors in an insurgency?" The answer to this question leads to the conclusion as to whether or

not the current EBO methodology is comprehensive enough to be effectively and efficiently used as a methodology for planning and conducting military operations against insurgency warfare.

## DEFINING CULTURE

### NEED FOR CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING

“I knew where every enemy tank was dug in on the outskirts of Tallil. Only problem was, my soldiers had to fight fanatics charging on foot or in pickups and firing AK-47s and RPGs [rocket propelled grenades]. I had perfect situational awareness. What I lacked was cultural awareness. Great technical intelligence...wrong enemy.”

*Battalion Cdr, 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division, OIF-I,  
commenting on enemy situational awareness<sup>4</sup>*

A 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division’s battalion commander going into the battle felt he had great situational awareness based on technical intelligence; however, in the heat of battle, he realized the technical intelligence had failed him and that his lack of cultural understanding of the enemy placed him in a situation he was not prepared to enter.

For many years, the United States’ military has failed to understand and appreciate the important role culture plays in evaluating and defeating an enemy. For example, during the Vietnam conflict, General Westmoreland, Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) Commander, was asked how he was going to defeat the Viet Cong, an unconventional enemy who utilized insurgent warfare against US forces and the Republic of South Vietnam. His answer was simply, “Firepower.”<sup>5</sup> General Westmoreland’s answer reflected a very important point. As the senior military commander in Vietnam, he did not fully understand the impact the enemy’s culture had on combat operations. His lack of cultural understanding resulted in his

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<sup>4</sup> Robert H. Scales Jr., MG(R), “Culture-Centric Warfare,” *Proceedings* (September 2004): 1.

<sup>5</sup> Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins Press, 1986), 197.



misrecognition of the enemy's center of gravity<sup>6</sup>. General Westmoreland identified the enemy's center of gravity as numerical troop strength. However, the North Vietnamese/Viet Cong's source of power did not lie in troop strength but in their relationship and access to the country's people.<sup>7</sup> General Westmoreland's failure to destroy the enemy's center of gravity, based on his lack of cultural understanding, resulted in the US failure to accomplish its strategic objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to the communist North Vietnamese.

The military's need for cultural understanding has not decreased but increased throughout the years. Entrusted with the mission of conducting full-spectrum operations, the current military performs everything from major combat operations to stability operations. Conducting stability operations such as peace keeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian assistance necessitates the military's understanding of different populations' cultures. This is supported in the Army's Field Manual (FM 3-07), *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, that states, "Cultural information is critical to gauge the potential reactions to the operation, to avoid misunderstandings, and to improve the effectiveness of the operations."<sup>8</sup> The field manual further states, "knowledge of the ethnic and religious factions in the AO [area of operation]...is vital to mission success...and ultimately [to] achieving the objectives of the operation."<sup>9</sup> When negotiating during stability operations, FM 3-07 states that the negotiating team's recognition of "national cultural differences" and its "understanding of the cultural context of terms is

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<sup>6</sup> Krepinevich, 4-13, 196-197. General Westmoreland fully embraced what Krepinevich describes as the "Army Concept" which focused on mid-intensity (conventional) war and high volumes of firepower. This concept is founded on the belief that the enemy's center of gravity is troop numerical strength—his army. Center of gravity also found in Joe Strange, *Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language*, Marine Corps University Perspectives on Warfighting No 4, 2nd ed. (Quantico, VA: Defense Automated Printing Center, 1996), 1-10.

<sup>7</sup> Krepinevich, 197.

<sup>8</sup> US Department of the Army, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 20 February 2003), 2-3. Available online at [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service\\_pubs/fm3\\_07.pdf/](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/fm3_07.pdf/) (accessed 11 September 2004).

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

invaluable” in negotiations with host and foreign nations.<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, a better understanding of culture is necessary for the military to successfully conduct full-spectrum operations both now and in the future.

## CULTURE DEFINED

Joint Publication (JP 1-02), *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, provides the official definition of culture used by DOD and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It defines culture as “a feature of the terrain that has been constructed by man. Included are such items as roads, building, and canals, boundary lines and in a broad sense, all names and legends on a map.”<sup>11</sup> The restrictiveness of this definition is indicative of the US military’s limited understanding of culture. Although this definition focuses on the material aspect of culture, it ignores the broader, more comprehensive meaning of culture involving the internal workings of man.

Numerous definitions for culture exist. Noted scholars spend years trying to understand and define culture. The more complete definitions of culture are usually found in nonmilitary writings. Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary defines culture as

“**a**: the integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief, and behavior that depends upon man's capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations **b**: the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial, religious, or social group **c**: the set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes a company or corporation”<sup>12</sup>

Apparent in this definition is the inclusion of values, attitudes, goals, beliefs, and behaviors.

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 10 October 2004). Available online <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/c/01437.html> (accessed 3 November 2004).

<sup>12</sup> Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, <http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=culture&x=17&y=20>, accessed 26 November 2004.

Professor John A. Lynn, former foreign policy aide to President Clinton, current political scientist at Harvard, and author of *Battle*, defines culture or “conceptual culture” as “values, beliefs, assumptions, expectations, preconceptions, and the like.”<sup>13</sup>

Samuel P. Huntington, chairman of the Harvard Academy for International and Areas Studies and professor at the prestigious Olin Institute of Strategic Studies, describes culture in his book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, as “the common theme in virtually all of civilization” manifested in the “overall way of life of a people” involving “values, norms, institutions, and modes of thinking to which successive generations have attached primary importance.”<sup>14</sup> Huntington adds that the “crucial distinctions among human groups concern their values, beliefs, institutions, and social structures.”<sup>15</sup>

Ambassador Edward L. Peck, former State Department Chief of Mission in Iraq from 1977-1980 and former Executive Secretary for the American Academy of Diplomacy states that culture is the dominant group’s “values, beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral norms which influence their outlook on life and acceptance to change.”<sup>16</sup> Edgar Schein, professor at the Sloan School of Management at MIT and author of the *Theory of Organizational Culture*, asserts that “beliefs and assumptions form the core of an organization’s culture” and that “culture is not a single belief or assumption, [but] it is a set of interrelated beliefs and assumptions.”<sup>17</sup>

Dr. Bronislaw Malinowski, renowned anthropologist and scientist, defines culture as an “integral whole consisting of implements and consumers’ goods, of constitutional charters for the

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<sup>13</sup> John A. Lynn, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), xix-xx.

<sup>14</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone, 1996), 41-42.

<sup>15</sup> Huntington, 42.

<sup>16</sup> Comments made by Ambassador Edward L. Peck, Chief of Mission in Iraq 1977-1980, to the audience of the “Turning Victory Into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign” CSI lecture series, 14 September 2004. Ambassador Peck’s lecture, “The Critical Role of Cultural Orientation in International Relations—and in War” focused on the importance of the cultural dimension after major combat operations.

<sup>17</sup> Mary Jo Hatch, ed., *Organization Theory: Modern, Symbolic, and Postmodern Perspectives* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 210.

various social groupings, of human ideas and crafts, beliefs and customs” which “include[s] also some elements which apparently remain intangible, inaccessible to direct observation, and where neither form nor function is very evident,” such as “ideas and values...interests and beliefs.”<sup>18</sup>

These various definitions provide recurring ideas and words describing culture. Culture primarily involves values, attitudes, beliefs, goals which are displayed in some form of religion, behavior, and customs. Therefore, the definition for culture that will be used throughout this paper is “the values, attitudes, beliefs, and goals that are manifested in religion, behavior, and customs.”<sup>19</sup> Values are the social principles or “standards held or accepted by an individual, class or society.”<sup>20</sup> Attitudes are the dispositions, opinions, or mental sets held by individuals or groups of people.<sup>21</sup> Belief is the “mental acceptance of something as true” especially a doctrine, creed, or tenet.<sup>22</sup> Goals are objects or ends that a person or group strives to obtain—an aim or aspiration.<sup>23</sup> These four factors—values, attitudes, beliefs, and goals—are prevalent and common in most civilizations and cultures.<sup>24</sup> Therefore for present purposes, these four factors will be used to determine if something is cultural or not.

## CHAPTER TWO - INSURGENCY

Recently, a lot has been written about insurgencies and, in particular, the insurgency in Iraq. Numerous definitions exist concerning insurgency which unfortunately leads to confusion and difficulty understanding what an insurgency really encompasses.<sup>25</sup> By examining the methods and writings of Mao Tse-tung, a chief proponent of insurgency; and studying the

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<sup>18</sup> Bronislaw Malinowski, *A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1944), 36, 69.

<sup>19</sup> This definition of culture is made up by the author of this paper.

<sup>20</sup> *Webster's New World College Dictionary*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Cleveland OH: Wiley Publishing Inc., 2002), 1579.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 91.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 132.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 607.

<sup>24</sup> Edward L. Peck, CSI Lecture, 14 September 2004.

<sup>25</sup> Numerous times the terms subversion, guerrilla warfare, revolution, and insurgency are incorrectly used interchangeably. Thomas Ross Mockaitis, *The British Experience in Counterinsurgency, 1919-1960* (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1988), 1.

analytical model for insurgency by Dr. Bard E. O'Neill, a general definition for insurgency can be developed, a framework for analyzing an insurgency will be understood, and key factors that characterize and judge insurgencies will be extracted.

## THE MAOIST STRATEGY

“Guerrilla (insurgent) warfare is neither a product of China nor peculiar to the present day. From the earliest historical days, it has been a feature of wars fought by every class of men against invaders and oppressors”<sup>26</sup>

Mao Tse-tung, 1937

The Maoist strategy is the most conceptually elaborate and most widely copied insurgent strategy in the world.<sup>27</sup> The strategy is multifaceted and emphasizes the interrelation of popular support, organization, and environment.<sup>28</sup> The three phases of the Maoist insurgency strategy are organization-terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and mobile-conventional warfare.<sup>29</sup>

The organization-terrorism phase focuses on political organization and mobilization through gaining popular support. First, insurgents create a network of cells (cellular networks) in order to disseminate political propaganda more efficiently and mobilize popular support.<sup>30</sup> Key leaders from the community are actively recruited to facilitate the important task of detaching the populace from the government.<sup>31</sup> Next, social groups are established to both accommodate the needs of the people and spread insurgent ideology in that area. In cases where members of the community resist or reject the insurgent ideology terrorism is used against them. Selectively using terrorism demonstrates the government's ineffectiveness to protect itself and its people and

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<sup>26</sup> Mao Tse-Tung, *On Guerilla Warfare* (New York, NY: Fredrick A. Praeger, Inc, 1961), 46.

<sup>27</sup> Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Dulles, VA: Brassey, Inc., 1990), 34.

<sup>28</sup> Bard E. O'Neill, et al., *Insurgency in the Modern World*, eds. Bard E. O'Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 30.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 28.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, 37.

persuades or intimidates obstinate members of the community who oppose the insurgency.<sup>32</sup> The organization-terrorism phase ends with the insurgents constructing shadow-government structures (parallel hierarchies) in order to institutionalize support and provide de facto control of the population.<sup>33</sup>

The second and longest phase of the Maoist insurgency strategy is the guerrilla warfare phase. The goal of this phase is to use guerrilla warfare tactics to win insurgent victories that will demoralize the government, garner defections from the government and create a sense of apathy in the government.<sup>34</sup> The guerrilla warfare phase itself is broken down into three stages—populace isolation, regional control expansion, and infrastructure establishment.<sup>35</sup> The first stage, populace isolation, focuses on isolating the people from the government.<sup>36</sup> The insurgent military conducts hit and run tactics against the government in order to provoke the government to develop a strategic defensive posture, disperse its forces, and protect potential targets from the insurgents. These targets are usually economic, military, or infrastructure related and of great importance to the government. The hit and run tactics may also provoke the government to enact counterterrorist measures that injure innocents, upsetting members of the populace and garnering their support.

The second stage, regional control expansion, involves the insurgents expanding their region of control and organizational size.<sup>37</sup> As regional forces emerge, full-time forces unite with them and connect villages into the larger political networks.<sup>38</sup> The parallel hierarchy is more

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<sup>32</sup> O'Neill, et al., *Insurgency in the Modern World*, 28.

<sup>33</sup> O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, 36.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 37.

<sup>35</sup> Populace isolation, regional control expansion, and infrastructure establishment are terms designated by the writer to better facilitate understanding of the guerrilla warfare phase for the reader.

<sup>36</sup> O'Neill, et al., *Insurgency in the Modern World*, 29.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

visible, resembles the state apparatus, and has auxiliary organizations that are controlled by revolutionary cells linked to the central government.<sup>39</sup>

The latter portion of regional control expansion focuses on the establishment of arsenals, arms productions facilities, and hospitals.<sup>40</sup> During this time the military recruits full time guerrillas, creates and trains regular army units, and establishes a reserve system. The military organizes into three levels—regional, district, and local—with all levels being coordinated by a central headquarters in pursuit of common military and political objectives.<sup>41</sup> With the military organized, the parallel hierarchy set up, and operating bases secure; the insurgents continue to avoid large governmental military sweeps, patrols and positional battles to demonstrate the government's impotence and inability to destroy them and emphasize their permanence in the society.<sup>42</sup> However, the insurgents continue to send their agents into governmentally controlled areas to implant new guerrilla cells and networks.<sup>43</sup>

The third and final phase of the Maoist insurgency strategy is the mobile-conventional warfare phase. This is the offensive phase of the strategy and is characterized by open civil war between the insurgent forces and the government. The overall goal of this phase is the displacement of the established regime. During this phase the regularization of guerrilla forces into conventional forces and the utilization of mobile-conventional warfare occurs.<sup>44</sup> The military focuses on destroying the government forces while the insurgent political body focuses on displacement of government authorities.<sup>45</sup> The scale of operations throughout this phase

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> O'Neill, et al., *Insurgency in the Modern World*, 29-30.

<sup>42</sup> O'Neill, et al. *Insurgency in the Modern World*, 29- 30 and John J. McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1966), 31-36.

<sup>43</sup> O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, 38.

<sup>44</sup> O'Neill, et al., *Insurgency in the Modern World*, 38.

<sup>45</sup> O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, 36.

demands high-level leadership skills, effective communications, and an efficient logistics system.<sup>46</sup>

The Maoist strategy of insurgency warfare has been copied and used for years by numerous revolutionaries seeking to overthrow their government. It theoretically entails an orderly progression through the three phases—organization-terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and mobile-conventional warfare—in order to secure victory. However, the factor most pivotal to the success of each stage and the overall strategy is the gaining and sustaining of popular support. Gaining and maintaining popular support sustains the insurgency throughout all the phases by providing food, shelter, able bodies, expertise, and momentum to the insurgents. Without popular support the insurgency would fail.

## **BARD O'NEILL'S FRAMEWORK**

Dr. Bard O'Neill provides a framework for the systematic analysis of insurgency warfare. To understand insurgency one must understand the nature of it. To truly comprehend the nature of insurgency one must identify and understand the goals, means, and strategy of the insurgent. Doctor O'Neill's model enables the analyst to examine an insurgency and determine the goals, means, strategy, and probability of the insurgency's success. O'Neill defines insurgency as "a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics."<sup>47</sup> A critical note in this definition is the focus of the insurgent party—to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the aspects of politics; and the means by which they will accomplish it—through violence and political resources.

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 38.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 13.



The aspects of politics represent the political apparatus of the ruling government. There are four aspects of politics—the political community, the political system, the authorities, and policies.<sup>48</sup> The political community comprises “those who act on a daily basis in the process of making and executing decisions.”<sup>49</sup> The political system comprises “the salient values, rules and structures that make up the basic framework guiding and limiting the making and execution of binding decisions.”<sup>50</sup> Values are of utmost importance in the political system and represent the “general ideas of the desirable such as equality, justice, liberty, and individualism” whereas rules are used to encourage the desired patterns of behaviors in the society.<sup>51</sup> The perception of legitimacy or illegitimacy in one of the political aspects determines whether an insurgency will develop or not.

The four types of political systems—traditional autocracy, modernizing autocracy, authoritarian, and pluralistic—each emphasize a different value or set of values.<sup>52</sup> Traditional autocracy emphasizes the leader’s right to rule based on birthright and religion. Its key values are elitism, ascription, and personalism.<sup>53</sup> Modernizing autocracy’s key value is building state power; however it still depends on birthright, elitism, and religion to legitimize leadership and ensures the masses do not participate in governing. The authoritarian political system’s key values are consensus and equality with a goal of completely controlling all aspects of political, economic, and social life of all its citizens.<sup>54</sup> The pluralistic system’s values are the “individual freedom, liberty, and compromise” and it accomplishes this through a democratic form of government.<sup>55</sup> These four types of systems—traditional autocracy, modernizing autocracy,

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 15-16

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 16.

authoritarian, and pluralistic--make up the political systems, which is a very powerful aspect of politics. Many times it is discontent with this aspect of politics that gives rise to an insurgency.

The third aspect of politics is the authorities. Authorities are those invested with the power to command or act on behalf of the ruling group. When the nonruling group considers specific individuals illegitimate because their behavior is either inconsistent with existing values and norms or viewed as corrupt, ineffective, or oppressive an insurrection can arise.<sup>56</sup> The final aspect of politics is policies—rules or plans that embrace the general goals and acceptable procedures of the government. If the nonruling group believes that the state's policies discriminate against them because of their ethnic, religious, racial, or economic standing; they “may resort to violence to change existing social, economic, or political policies they believe discriminate against particular groups.”<sup>57</sup>

The goal of the insurgents and the aspect of politics that the insurgents focus on to achieve that goal identifies the type of insurgency one is observing. There are seven different types of insurgencies. The first four types of insurgencies—anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, and pluralist—are revolutionary because their goal is to completely change the existing political system. The first type, the anarchist, primary goal is to eliminate all institutionalized political arrangement. The main goal of the second type, the egalitarian, is to impose a new political system based on the value of distributional equality and centrally controlled structures designed to radically transform social structure and mobilize the populace.<sup>58</sup> The traditionalists' goal is to displace the political system with an autocratic system and leader supported by the clergy, military, and nobility. The value they articulate is rooted in ancestries and religion.<sup>59</sup> The pluralists' seek revolutionary transformation by establishing political structures that are

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 18.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

differentiated and autonomous.<sup>60</sup> Their goal is to establish a system that values freedom, liberty and compromise. The secessionists' goal is to separate completely from the state and develop a new, independent government. The reformists' goal is for increased political, social, and economic benefits for their constituents; however, unlike the secessionist they want to keep the same government. The final type, the preservationist, main goal is to maintain the status quo or current political system because he is the main benefactor of that government.<sup>61</sup> The ability to differentiate between the goals of each movement enables one to identify, understand and differentiate between the various types of insurgencies. However, difficulties can occur identifying the different types of insurgencies when insurgent movements experience goal transformation, goal conflicts, goal ambiguity, utilize misleading rhetoric, or have multiple participants.<sup>62</sup>

Insurgencies involve both a political and violent aspect to them. It is this violent aspect of insurgency that primarily differentiates it from other political movements. The violent aspect of insurgency is manifested through three different forms of warfare—terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and conventional warfare. Insurgent terrorism is purposeful violence usually aimed at unarmed noncombatant that seeks to achieve specific goals. The long-term goal of insurgent terrorism is to erode the government's psychological support by instilling fear into governmental officials, domestic supporters, and international supporters.<sup>63</sup> Guerrilla warfare, the most familiar kind of insurgent violence, is characterized by "hit-and-run attacks by lightly to moderately armed groups that seek to harass the enemy and gradually erode his will and capability."<sup>64</sup> This type of violence is usually aimed at military and police forces and was successfully used by Mao Tse-tung during his insurgency in China. Conventional warfare is the direct confrontation of

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 21-22.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 25.

large, traditional units in the field.<sup>65</sup> This type of warfare, used only when conditions are set for an insurgency to conduct large-scale military operations, necessitates a high-level command and control structure and an efficient logistics base for its success.

Insurgents adopt various strategic approaches to maximize the effectiveness of their political techniques and forms of warfare in their pursuit of victory.<sup>66</sup> These strategies have provided both guidance and inspiration to insurgent movements in the past and continue to do so today. The four strategies are the conspiratorial strategy, the protracted popular war strategy, the military focus strategy and the urban warfare strategy. The conspiratorial strategy emphasizes a “small, secretive, disciplined and tightly organized group” for seizing power with the defection of the state’s military officers being an essential variable.<sup>67</sup> This strategy, characterized by low-level violence, is best exemplified by Lenin and the Bolshevik insurrection.<sup>68</sup>

The protracted popular war strategy emphasizes political primacy, mass organization, and a gradual escalation of violence.<sup>69</sup> It consists of three sequential phases—the strategic defensive, the strategic stalemate, and the strategic offensive.<sup>70</sup> During the strategic defensive, insurgents focus on gaining popular support, establishing organizations, inflicting low-level violence, and ensuring the continued existence of the movement. The strategic stalemate, the longest phase, focuses on demoralizing the government forces through guerrilla warfare. Repeated victories, expansion of the insurgent political organization, establishment of base camps and parallel hierarchies, and the creation and training of a regular army enable the insurgents to transition to the final phase—the strategic offensive. In the strategic offensive insurgents conduct open war utilizing regularized troops in conventional operations. The insurgent’s political objective is displacement of the governing authorities while its military objective is destruction of

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid, 26.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 32.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 32.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., 50.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 35.

the government's military. Historically, the protracted popular war, made famous by Mao Tse-tung, is the most elaborate and copied insurgency strategy.<sup>71</sup>

The military-focus strategy gives primacy to the military and focuses on either the guerrilla or conventional forms of warfare to achieve insurgency goals. Unlike the protracted popular war strategy, the military-focus strategy does not make a sustained or systematic effort to garner popular support. Instead the insurgents believe that either current popular support is adequate to facilitate their movement or that popular support will be gained through insurgent victories on the battlefield.<sup>72</sup> The Confederacy utilized this type of strategy in the American Civil War.<sup>73</sup>

O'Neill's fourth and final strategic approach—the urban-warfare strategy—primarily utilizes terrorism and guerrilla attacks in urban areas to erode the government's will. The urban terrorist strategy is to perform violent acts that transform a political crisis into a military situation in which harsh reprisals by the government will alienate the populace and engender public support of the insurgency. Insurgents can precisely or loosely follow all four strategic approaches. The importance of the approaches is that they provide theoretical models by which the insurgents can plan and execute their movement.

## Six Key Factors

The most prominent feature of the Bard O'Neill analytical model is the six key factors he deems crucial for the success of an insurgency.<sup>74</sup> These factors serve as standards for evaluating and assessing the military, political, and strategic effectiveness of an insurgency. The six factors

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 34.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 41.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 41.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 50.

are popular support, external support, cohesion, organization, the environment, and the government's role.<sup>75</sup>

One of the most important factors in determining the success of an insurgency is popular support. Mao Tse-tung said "the richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people" and for many insurgent leaders popular support is the overriding strategic consideration.<sup>76</sup> Popular support is critical because most insurgencies are initially at a disadvantage against the government. The insurgent's challenges include: the government's vast infrastructure, established military, control of the police force, and easy access to the economy present. To offset the government's advantage, the insurgents actively attempt to gain the population's support. To fully understand popular support one must understand the two types of popular support, the role of the intellectuals and masses, and the different techniques utilized by insurgents to gain popular support.

The two types of popular support are active and passive support. Active supporters are those willing to risk personal sacrifices on behalf of the insurgents. They provide intelligence, concealment, shelter, supplies, and sometimes perform acts of disobedience against the government.<sup>77</sup> Passive supporters are those who "merely sympathize with the aim and activities of the insurgent."<sup>78</sup> While passive supporters do not directly provide aid to the insurgents their refusal to betray the insurgents is a key factor because it enhances the insurgents' ability to elude government officials. Both types of active and passive popular support enhance the insurgent's ability to continue to resist and thwart the government's ability to conduct an effective counterinsurgency.

Recruiting the people in a community requires an understanding of the community's culture. This is an important fact because in order to proselytize the people insurgents have to

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 31.

<sup>76</sup> O'Neill, et al., *Insurgency in the Modern World*, 6.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

understand and appeal to their beliefs, values, attitudes and emotions. The insurgent must be able to understand some of the population's deep-seated assumptions and the goals they have for themselves and their family.

Populations in which insurgents seek support are usually heterogeneous and the insurgents use this to their advantage. Varying economic classes, races, ethnicity, religion, and education levels necessitate that insurgents comprehend the culture from which they are recruiting. Utilizing ideological arguments that foster governmental discontent, insurgents actively recruit from universities and middle level government positions. This class of intellectual class or intelligentsia is crucial to the insurgency because it provides the insurgent leadership with "strategic vision, organizational know-how, and technical competence."<sup>79</sup> Focusing on arguments of governmental abuse and apathy to the needs of the people, the insurgents recruit the masses. Support from the masses is crucial because the population's calls for political change will usually be met with resistance from the government.<sup>80</sup>

There are various methods insurgents use to gain support and recruits. All of these methods focus on convincing the people to support the insurgents' goal because it is just and achievable.<sup>81</sup> The six methods used are: charismatic attraction, esoteric appeals, exoteric appeals, terrorism, provocation of government counterterrorism, and demonstration of potency.<sup>82</sup> Charismatic attraction describes the force of the leader's personality, which becomes the principal reason that people support the insurgency.<sup>83</sup> Many times the leader is so persuasive because he is usually able to tap into the psyche and the traditions of the culture. Esoteric appeals are focused at the intellectual community or strata and "seek to clarify the environmental conditions by putting them in a theoretical context that has neat, orderly interpretations and explanations for all

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<sup>79</sup> O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, 73.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 74.

<sup>81</sup> O'Neill, et al., *Insurgency in the Modern World*, 6.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., 7.

perceived social, economic, and political ‘realities.’”<sup>84</sup> Both ideology and theology are esoteric in nature.

Exoteric appeals focus on the real grievances of the masses and the intelligentsia. Grievances of the masses are on genuine matters such as the need for food, medical assistance, jobs, corruption and repression by local officials, and land reform.<sup>85</sup> The intelligentsia grievances are underemployment, unemployment, and the psychosocial problems (loss of status, recognition, etc) related to it. When exoteric and esoteric methods fail to obtain popular support, insurgents turn to the use of terrorism.<sup>86</sup> The selective use of terrorist acts by the insurgents is intended to gain popular support by demonstrating the government’s inability to stop insurgent plans.<sup>87</sup>

The fifth method of obtaining popular support, the provocation of government counterterrorism, focuses on instigating and intensifying government counterterror and repression in order to further alienate the populace.<sup>88</sup> The final method, the demonstration of potency, has two dimensions: meeting the people’s need through an administrative apparatus that provides social services (medical care, schools) and gaining the military initiative.<sup>89</sup>

The second key factor critical to the overall success of an insurgency is the environment. The two general components of the environment are the physical aspect and the human dimension. The physical aspect “refers to the terrain, climate, and transportation-communication system.”<sup>90</sup> The human dimension concentrates on “demography, social structure, economics and the political culture and system.”<sup>91</sup> Many scholars of insurgency focus on the physical aspects of

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<sup>84</sup> O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, 75.

<sup>85</sup> O’Neill, et al., *Insurgency in the Modern World*, 8.

<sup>86</sup> O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, 79 and Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), 236

<sup>87</sup> O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, 79 and 91 and Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare* (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1996), 16-17.

<sup>88</sup> O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, 80.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., 82.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., 53.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., 59.



the environment; however the human dimension of the environment is just as significant.<sup>92</sup> The social structure of the environment has a large impact on progression of insurgency.<sup>93</sup>

Societies are structured both vertically and horizontally.<sup>94</sup> Vertically they are divided along the lines of race, ethnicity, and religion.<sup>95</sup> Horizontally they are divided by class and caste.<sup>96</sup> The vertical societal division—race, ethnicity, and religion—is the prominent division that insurgencies most commonly exploit. “Societal cleavages along racial, ethnic, and religious lines are frequently among the root causes of insurgency and can be either helpful or detrimental to the progression of an insurrection.”<sup>97</sup> Insurgents usually look for and find the disadvantaged group in a population, identify its general attitudes, various goals, and its specific beliefs and grievances; and gain its support through propaganda and ideology. Focusing on the ethnic, racial or religious stratifications found in the social structure enables insurgents to craft propaganda or ideological messages in line with the populace’s beliefs and attitudes and mobilize them to action.

The third key factor of an insurgency is organization. Efficient organization enables insurgents to compensate for their material inadequacies and the resource superiority of the state. Insurgent organizations have “three structural dimensions—scope, complexity, and **cohesion**—and two functions—instrumental services and channels for expressive protest”—that are of primary interest.<sup>98</sup> “Scope refers to the numbers and kinds of people across the political spectrum who either play key roles in the movement (political cadres, terrorists, guerrillas, and regular soldiers) or provide active support.”<sup>99</sup> Complexity refers to the organizational structure of an insurgency. It is the ability of the insurgent leaders to identify, integrate, coordinate, and diversify their organization into military operations, communications, transportation, logistics,

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<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., 59-60.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., 59.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., 60.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., 90.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

and training.<sup>100</sup> Increasing the complexity enables insurgents to more effectively perform the expressive and instrumental functions that attract adherents.<sup>101</sup>

The ability of the insurgency leadership to effectively use people to achieve goal attainment and overall success largely depends on the strategic approach the leadership is employing. The insurgency strategy will dictate how leaders integrate and coordinate various tasks and roles necessary for success in combat operations, training, logistics, transportation, communications, informational, financial, supervisory, and diplomatic areas.<sup>102</sup> The urban-warfare strategy and conspiratorial strategy require less complex organizations. (Organizational complexity is minimal for insurgents who subscribe to urban-warfare and conspiratorial strategies because of their tight-knit, secretive organizations.) Protracted popular and military-focus strategies require a more elaborate/complex organizational structure due to the nature of those insurgencies. The complex organizations that usually arise in the more elaborate strategies are referred to as parallel hierarchies or shadow governments.<sup>103</sup> Parallel hierarchies can assume several shapes. The most familiar form of parallel hierarchy “is the creation of political structures or institutions to administer, organize, and rule the population areas controlled by the insurgents” who challenge the government by establishing secret cells that actively penetrate and recruit in various population areas.<sup>104</sup> The less common parallel hierarchy infiltrates the established government structure, obtains critical governmental information, and expands its influence over the population.

The instrumental and expressive functions of parallel hierarchies are simple. Participation in an insurgency provides low self esteem individuals, loners and failures with a sense of belonging to a cause. It also provides them with structure, an avenue to vent their

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<sup>100</sup> Ibid., 91.

<sup>101</sup> O’Neill, et al., *Insurgency in the Modern World*, 13.

<sup>102</sup> O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, 91.

<sup>103</sup> O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, 91 and Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare* (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1996), 30, 70.

<sup>104</sup> O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, 92.

frustrations, and a new family. Additionally if the insurgency has material—food, medical supplies, agricultural tools--in can improve the welfare of its members.<sup>105</sup> Carefully examining the organizations of insurgency provides good insight into the progress of the insurgents and the degree of threat they will present the government.

Cohesion, the fourth factor in determining the success of an insurgency, has been argued by some authorities as being the critical principle behind all effective insurgent strategy. One of the most famous and strong adherents to the importance of cohesion to an insurgency was Mao Tse-tung. Mao believed that “centralized command” aided the insurgents’ ability to inflict damage on the enemy and garner popular support.<sup>106</sup> Although cohesion has shown to have a profound impact on the success of an insurgency the absence of it does not always result in failure. When the government loses its will to resist, it offsets the affects of the insurgent’s disunity.<sup>107</sup>

The fifth key factor, external support, can be in the form of moral, political, material, and sanctuary support. Moral support involves a public announcement by a foreign body or government that the insurgency is just and admirable.<sup>108</sup> Political support involves a foreign nation championing and supporting the insurgency’s strategic goal in the international arena such as the United Nations. Material support entails the foreign nation actually providing monetary, weapon, medical, and training support to the insurgency. A good example of this is the Soviet and Chinese support of the Viet Minh during both the French Indochina war and the Vietnam conflict. Sanctuaries are areas provided by the foreign government in which insurgents can train, stockpile arms, plan operations, and escape home government retribution.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 95.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., 98.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> O’Neill, et al., *Insurgency in the Modern World*, 15.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

The sixth and final factor critical to the success of an insurgency is government response. Of all the factors “that have a bearing on the progress and outcome of insurgencies, none is more important than the government’s response.”<sup>110</sup> Government response is the most important factor because the government possesses the ability to correct or negate the conditions that gave rise to insurgency in the first place. “What the government does or neglects to do and how it performs has a direct bearing on the strategies and forms of warfare insurgents choose and the nature and extent of challenges insurgents must cope with as they seek to accomplish their aims. The more government responses are informed, prudent, relevant, determined and disciplined, the greater the burden of the insurgents.”<sup>111</sup> Overall the six key factors of an insurgency—popular support, environment, organization, external support, cohesion, and government response—provide the analyst with insight and criteria to judge the effectiveness of an insurgency.

Both Mao Tse-tung’s and Dr. Bard O’Neill’s models provide insightful definitions for insurgency. O’Neill’s definition is more comprehensive than Mao’s definition because O’Neill had the benefit of extensively studying Mao’s definition and model of insurgency. O’Neill took both Mao’s model and definition and incorporated them into his own definition and model. Thus the six key factors of insurgency are representative of both O’Neill’s and Mao’s models.

## **CULTURAL – INSURGENCY SYNTHESIS AND ANALYSIS**

Determining the *cultural factors of insurgency* requires viewing the key insurgency factors through a cultural lens. This means examining each insurgency factor—popular support, environment, organization, external support, cohesion and government response—and seeing which of those factors involve the four aspects of culture--values, attitudes, goals, and beliefs. The insurgency factor that encompasses all four aspects of culture is the factor that will be

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<sup>110</sup> O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, 125.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., 153.

considered culturally related and identified as a cultural factor of insurgency. Two of the six insurgency factors fulfill this requirement; they are popular support and the environment.

Popular support is a cultural factor of insurgency because the methods that insurgents use to gain popular support focuses on all aspects of culture. Recruiting people in a community requires an understanding of the culture of the masses. Insurgents proselytize people by appealing to their beliefs, values, attitude and emotions. They understand and communicate to the population the deep-seated values and goals the people have for themselves and families. The use of charismatic attraction, esoteric appeals, and exoteric appeals all focus on appealing to the values, attitudes, beliefs, or goals of the populace to gain its support. The charismatic leader's personality appeals to the beliefs and attitudes of the population of what a strong leader should be and uses attitude to gain their support. Esoteric appeals win over the intelligentsia by focusing on their ideological values, attitudes, and beliefs and using these factors to secure their support. Exoteric methods focus on the real grievances of the populace and their beliefs and attitudes concerning those grievances to mobilize the populace.

Environment is a cultural factor of insurgency because of environment's human dimension. Race, ethnicity, and religion are part of this dimension and all three are imbued with the cultural factors of values, attitudes, beliefs and goals. Many times societal cleavages along racial, ethnic, and religious line are the root causes of insurgency.<sup>112</sup> The identification of specific racial and ethnic groups by their particular values, attitudes, goals and beliefs sometimes causes friction within different groups in a society. This friction, if great enough, can cause civil war and sometimes insurgencies. The identification of a group of people to their race, ethnicity, and religion is so strong that people individually and society as a whole frequently use the word culture interchangeably to describe people's race, ethnicity, and religion.

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<sup>112</sup> Ibid., 60.

## CHAPTER 3 - EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS (EBO)

“The EBO methodology appears to be an optimum way to deal with the wider range of actions confronting the United States today. It can be applied to virtually every national security activity, including all military actions.”<sup>113</sup>

CADRE Paper No. 15

On September 11, 2001, the security environment of America fundamentally changed. A new strategic security environment faces the United States that requires the country to explore innovative ways to protect its citizens and to secure its national interests at home and abroad. Additionally, the new strategic security paradigm being fashioned by the United States focuses on prevention in place of retaliation, by “stopping the terrorist outright, deterring their sponsors, or convincing them that terror can not succeed.”<sup>114</sup> This new prevention-based deterrence approach requires a balanced application of both civil and military power—fully using all instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—in order to shape behaviors.<sup>115</sup> It is this shaping of behavior that is the essence of EBOs.<sup>116</sup>

The United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) defines EBO as “operations that are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted based on a holistic understanding of the operational environment in order to influence or change system behavior or capabilities using the integrated application of selected instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims.”<sup>117</sup> “Operations” represent a coordinated set of actions (or facets of military and national power) that have the

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<sup>113</sup> Edward C. Mann III, Gary Endersby, Thomas R. Searle, *Thinking Effects: Effects-Based Methodology For Joint Operations*, CADRE Paper No. 15 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, October 2002), 43. Available online at <http://auspress.maxwell.af.mil/>, 43.

<sup>114</sup> Edward A. Smith, *Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare to Peace, Crisis, and War* (Washington, DC: CCRP Publications, 2002), xiii. Available online at [http://www.dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Smith\\_EBO.PDF](http://www.dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Smith_EBO.PDF).

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

<sup>117</sup> United States Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 7: Operational Implications of Effects-based Operations (EBO)* (Norfolk, VA: Joint Forces Command, 17 November 2004), 2.

capability to shape the decisions of an actor.<sup>118</sup> The operational environment is “the composite of elements, conditions and influences that affect the employment of resources and capabilities and that bear on the decisions of the commander.”<sup>119</sup> It is an environment in which a decision-maker has to operate, and its size varies. For instance, President Bush’s operational environment is global in size for the global war on terrorism (GWOT). Another example is a Joint Force Commander (JFC) whose operational environment could be limited to a specific region of a country.

A “system” is a “functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of elements that interact together as a whole.”<sup>120</sup> These elements can be individuals, an inanimate object, a group of people, or a nation. The “integrated application” refers to the harmonized application that results from the effects-based planning, execution, and assessment process.<sup>121</sup> “Instruments of power” refer to the elements of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME)—that are “available to the President to influence the operational environment.”<sup>122</sup> “Directed policy aims” are the President’s objectives that comprise the desired national end state relevant to the operation at hand.”<sup>123</sup>

Although this definition of EBO seems exhaustive, it is not.<sup>124</sup> There are numerous definitions for EBO that range from shaping the cognitions and behaviors of both adversaries and allies to EBO being a tool used at the military’s tactical level.<sup>125</sup> However, to fully comprehend

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<sup>118</sup> Smith, xv.

<sup>119</sup> United States Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet* 7, 2.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>124</sup> This definition is used because it the most comprehensive. The “theme” or elements that all definitions of EBO had in common was that EBO involved “coordinated actions” that utilized the “elements of national power” to change the behavior of an actor in order to achieve national policy aims.

<sup>125</sup> There are seven total definitions of EBO that are can be found in doctrinal and research publications. USJFCOM has four different definitions. The College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE) Air University has another definition utilized by the Air Force. The Department of Defense’s Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD) for Research and the OASD for

EBO, one must understand the nature of effects, network-centric operations, operational net assessment (ONA) and the three major components of EBO—effects-based planning (EBP), effects-based execution (EBE), and effects-based assessment (EBA).

## THE NATURE OF EFFECTS

There are many facets to EBO; however, to understand EBO one has to start with its most basic element—effect. An “effect” is an outcome or result caused by an action.<sup>126</sup> “Effects” are the “full range of outcomes, events, or consequences that result from a specific action.”<sup>127</sup> The nature of effects describes the way effects behave and is depicted in three simple terms—categories, characteristics, and types.<sup>128</sup>

The first term is categories—direct and indirect. Direct effects are the immediate, first order consequences/results of an action unaltered by intervening events or mechanisms.<sup>129</sup> They are easily recognizable and typically instantaneous. An example of a direct effect is the destruction of a tank caused by a direct hit from an air force bomber. Indirect effects, on the other hand, are generally hard to recognize, usually displaced, and frequently highlighted by intermediate events. They are the delayed second- and third-order consequences of an action that can be either physical or psychological in nature.<sup>130</sup> An example of an indirect effect is a group of tank commanders being immobilized with fear (a psychological and physical effect) after seeing their fellow commander’s tank demolished by an air force bomber.

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Transformation both have definitions for EBO. They can be found in chapter 4 of this paper. They also can be found in *EBO: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War* and *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach*, respectively.

<sup>126</sup> US Department of Defense, JP 3-0 RFD, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 15 September 2004), III-7.

<sup>127</sup> Mann, et al., 31 and JP 3-0 RFD, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, III-7.

<sup>128</sup> Mann, et al., *Thinking Effects*, 30-36 and US Department of Defense, JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 17 January 2002), I-5- I-8.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

<sup>130</sup> JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*, I-6.



The second term of nature of effects is characteristics. Characteristics of effects influence the impact direct and indirect effects have on enemy capabilities. The distinct characteristics of effects are that they are cumulative, cascading, and collateral. Cumulative effects are “the aggregate result of many direct or indirect effects against an adversary.”<sup>131</sup> They usually flow from lower-to-higher levels and tend to compound and occur at the highest level.<sup>132</sup> An example of this phenomenon is the establishment of overall coalition air superiority resulting from the destruction of Surface to Air Missile (SAM) sites located in different geographical areas (Mann, 33). Cascading effects are “indirect effect[s] that ripple through an adversary system, often affecting other systems.”<sup>133</sup> They usually flow from the higher-to-lower levels of war, rippling through an enemy’s system influencing other nodes of the system as they go. A good example of cascading effects is that by destroying an adversary’s central headquarters the effects/results usually cascade down to subordinate elements/echelons severely disrupting their ability to command and control.<sup>134</sup> Collateral effects are consequences that result when something occurs other than what was originally intended.<sup>135</sup> These unintended outcomes can be either positive or negative; however, they are generally manifested in the form of damage or injury to persons and objects not related to the original objectives.<sup>136</sup> Examples of this occurrence are a child being injured playing with unexploded ordnance from a previous war and a civilian water source being contaminated by the uranium found in expended tank rounds.

The final term of nature of effects is types. Types of effects are physical, functional, systemic and psychological. “Physical effects are created by the direct impact, through physical alteration, on an object or system targeted by the application of military resources.”<sup>137</sup> Functional

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<sup>131</sup> Mann et al., 96.

<sup>132</sup> JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*, I-6.

<sup>133</sup> Mann, et al., *Thinking Effects*, 95.

<sup>134</sup> Mann, et al., *Thinking Effects*, 34 and JP 3-60, I-7.

<sup>135</sup> Mann, et al., *Thinking Effects*, 34 and JP 3-60, I-7.

<sup>136</sup> JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*, I-6.

<sup>137</sup> Mann, et al., *Thinking Effects*, 37.

effects are the direct or indirect effects of a military action, attack, or operation on the ability of a particular target/object to function properly.<sup>138</sup> Systemic effects are “indirect effects aimed at affecting or disrupting the operation of a specific system or set of systems.”<sup>139</sup> Psychological effects are “the results of actions that influence motives, emotions, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.”<sup>140</sup>

The nature of effects plays a large part in the overall effectiveness of EBO. Planners and decision makers who understand how effects behave can more effectively plan operations that capitalize on the power inherent in the nature of effects while minimizing the problems that accompany it.

## NETWORK CENTRIC OPERATIONS

“In the information age, power is increasingly derived from information sharing, information access, and speed.”<sup>141</sup> Network-centric operations are based on and enabled by ongoing technological revolutions in the area of sensors, information technology, and weapons.<sup>142</sup> Network-centric operations capitalize on “capabilities for greater collaboration and coordination in real time which result in greater speed of command, increased self-synchronization and greater precision of desired effects.”<sup>143</sup> It leverages technologies and provides users the ability to think differently about how to organize and fight.<sup>144</sup> Network-centric operations accelerate a military’s ability to know and decide by linking sensors, communication systems and weapon systems in an integrated grid.<sup>145</sup> This combination of emerging tactics, techniques and technologies that a

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<sup>138</sup> Ibid., 37, 97.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid., 38.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid., 98.

<sup>141</sup> US Department of Defense, *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Fall 2003), 13. Available online at [http://www.oft.osd.mil/document\\_297\\_MT\\_StrategyDoc1.pdf](http://www.oft.osd.mil/document_297_MT_StrategyDoc1.pdf) (accessed 10 November 2004).

<sup>142</sup> Smith, xiii.

<sup>143</sup> US Department of Defense, *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach*, 31.

<sup>144</sup> Smith, xiv.

<sup>145</sup> US Department of Defense, *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach*, 13.

networked force employs creates a decisive warfighting edge and is referred to as network-centric warfare (NCW).<sup>146</sup> However, the true power of network-centric operations rests in its application. Network-centric operations are a means to an end. The narrow application of network-centric operations to warfare simply results in more efficient attrition; however utilizing network-centric operations within the construct of EBO truly unlocks its potential.<sup>147</sup> An EBO enables the user “to apply the power of network-centric operations to the human dimension of war and to military operations across the spectrum of conflict from peace, to crisis, to war, which a new strategic deterrence demands.”<sup>148</sup>

Network-centric operations provide four important elements found in a successful EBO. These elements are predicated on the ability of network-centric operations to provide responsive, networked systems and a shared situational awareness to the user giving that user both information superiority and dominance over the adversary. The key elements are options, agility, coordination, and knowledge mobilization.<sup>149</sup>

Options are the wide range of useful alternatives offered to the decision maker due to network-centric operations’ ability to link diverse and geographically separated capabilities.<sup>150</sup> Options allow the decision maker to tailor his actions precisely to a situation in order to maximize their impact.<sup>151</sup> Agility is the ability to adapt to an “intelligent adversary’s actions” due to the shared awareness, speed of command, and responsiveness of networked forces provided by network-centric operations. Network-centric operations enable commanders and leaders to “shape and reshape [their] options and actions amid the give-and-take of battle and crisis operations.”<sup>152</sup> Coordination is accomplished through network-centric operations’ ability to

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<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

<sup>147</sup> Smith, xiv.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid., xviii.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid., xviii-xix.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid., xix.

leverage technology and coordinate diverse actions, “shared situational awareness and understanding of command intent, coupled with the capacity” which enables the user to synchronize and self-synchronize anywhere in the battlespace.<sup>153</sup> It is the capability to “coordinate complex actions and effects that will produce a unity of effect across levels and arenas in which diverse actions build on each other synergistically.”<sup>154</sup> Knowledge mobilization, the final and most important element related to the success of EBO, represents “how well we mobilize knowledge and expertise to bear so as to provide timely, relevant support to decision makers at all levels.”<sup>155</sup> It can only be accomplished through flexible and responsive networking.

## **OPERATIONAL NET ASSESSMENT (ONA)**

Military operations demand “information, knowledge, and understanding—critical components of the military commander’s decision-making process.”<sup>156</sup> Current innovations in technology allow for “an advanced knowledge environment that focuses on and supports that process and uses the collective expertise of our own sources and allies.”<sup>157</sup> An ONA meets the demand of the military commander by creating that knowledge environment. “Operational net assessment is the integration of people, processes, and tools that use multiple information sources and collaborative analysis to build shared knowledge of the adversary, the environment, and ourselves.”<sup>158</sup> Its main purpose is to establish a knowledge base for utilization in EBO. “The

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<sup>153</sup> Ibid.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

<sup>156</sup> United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Experimentation Division, *A Concept Paper for Operational Net Assessment (ONA) Version 2.0*, (Norfolk, VA: 3 May 2004), 1.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid.

<sup>158</sup> United States Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 4: Doctrinal Implications of Operational Net Assessment (ONA)* (Norfolk, VA: United States Joint Forces Command, 24 February 2004), 1.

ONA process [also] develops knowledge to link national objectives to integrated options that influence an adversary's perceptions, decision-making, and behavior.”<sup>159</sup>

An ONA is a key enabler and integral part of EBO by providing “an expanded, holistic view of the battlespace that also includes the linkages between the adversary's political structure, military capabilities, economic system, social structure and the information and infrastructure networks that underpin societies, whether those societies are nation states or groups of like-minded individuals.”<sup>160</sup> Examining the PMESII (political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure) system as an adaptive system of systems enables the decision maker to leverage the full force of United States' instruments of power (i.e., DIME) to far-reaching effect.<sup>161</sup>

Another way ONA enables EBO is by providing “the basis for planning, execution, and assessment of effects-based operations.”<sup>162</sup> In effects-based planning, “ONA strives to provide an understanding of cause-and-effect relationships and helps planners understand all the potential consequences of certain actions.”<sup>163</sup> This understanding informs the planning process “of possible courses of action based on a comparison of desired and unintended effects, as well as measures of effectiveness to determine whether the effects are actually achieved.”<sup>164</sup> Operational net assessment establishes the baseline knowledge environment used in effects-based planning “to develop potential effects, identify relevant nodes, determine appropriate actions, specify required resources, and consider potential consequences.”<sup>165</sup>

The ONA “provides planners and the commander visibility of the effects-to-task linkages, resource requirements, secondary/cascading effects and potential unintended

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<sup>159</sup> United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Experimentation Division, *A Concept Paper for Operational Net Assessment (ONA) Version 2.0*, (Norfolk, VA: 3 May 2004), 13.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

consequences.”<sup>166</sup> In addition, it “supplies the information needed to interface with partners’ (e.g., interagency participants, multinational partners, and military components) potential courses of actions (COA).”<sup>167</sup> When linked with the national and theater guidance, available resources, and applicable rules of engagement, the ONA provides the basis for effects-based planning.”<sup>168</sup>

Essential to the development of the ONA is the system-of-systems analysis (SoSA), “an analytic framework and process which examines potential adversaries within a combatant commander’s designated focus area (a nation, region, entity, or contingency).”<sup>169</sup> A SoSA is a continuous, collaborative process which analyzes the adversary holistically as inter-related system of PMESII systems.<sup>170</sup> System of systems analysis surveys the adversary as a multi-dimensional whole, seeks to find relationships within and among the systems and sub-systems, and attempts to identify the adversary’s vulnerable leverage points.<sup>171</sup> “Knowledge of these leverage points, when linked to desirable effects, potential actions and resources provides decision-makers with a range of options for effects-base operations.”<sup>172</sup>

The Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) is a key enabler of the ONA. “It is a virtual aggregation of individuals, organizations, systems, infrastructure, and processes for the common purpose of creating and sharing the data, information, and knowledge necessary to rapidly plan, execute and assess joint force operations.”<sup>173</sup> It enables a commander to make decisions more quickly and more effectively than the enemy. “The CIE provides the medium that transforms a collection of networks into a ‘cyber environment’ to support mission accomplishment.”<sup>174</sup> It “facilitates the forming of communities of interest (COI) and information

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<sup>166</sup> Ibid., 25

<sup>167</sup> Ibid.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid., 22.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., 23.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid., 16-17.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>173</sup> *Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 4*, 4.

<sup>174</sup> “A Concept Paper For Joint Experimentation: Operational Net Assessment (ONA)”, 26

exchange between centers of excellence (COE).”<sup>175</sup> The CIE also offers the capability to facilitate creation of a shared situational awareness in order to help various agencies of instruments of power operate with the enhanced unity of effort originally envisioned in the EBO concept.<sup>176</sup>

Operational net assessment is a key enabler an integrated part of EBO. It “provides the knowledge foundation used to influence an adversary’s perceptions, decision-making, and elements of national will” and its process facilitates the knowledge and decision superiority requisite to defeat the enemy.<sup>177</sup> Absent of ONA, the EBO would lack the shared awareness of the adversary and the environment necessary for its success at the operational level of war.

### **THREE MAJOR COMPONENTS OF EBO**

There are three major components involved in the EBO process. They are effects-based planning (EBP), effects-based execution (EBE), and effects-based assessment (EBA). These three components are highly interdependent and overlap each other. All three components are enabled by ONA and CIE.<sup>178</sup>

### **EFFECTS-BASED PLANNING (EBP)**

Fundamentally, EBP is about integrating all instruments of power (i.e., DIME) actions “within the battlespace in time, space, and purpose to create the desired effects to achieve the Joint Force Commander’s (JFC) objectives.”<sup>179</sup> Effects-based planning focuses at the theater-strategic and operational levels and “emphasizes connecting theater objectives to tactical tasks through the attainment of desired effects within the operational environment.”<sup>180</sup> “In EBP,

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<sup>175</sup> Ibid.

<sup>176</sup> United States Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet* 7, 9.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>180</sup> Ibid.

planners seek to promote unity of effort—to harmonize joint, combined and interagency actions associated with the DIME instruments of power into an integrated, comprehensive plan to achieve desired effects.”<sup>181</sup>

Effects are created to achieve objectives. “In an EBO context, an objective describes the clearly defined attainable goal toward which the entire operation is directed.”<sup>182</sup> Identifying objectives for tactical action is still an important element of tactical level planning; however, “at the operational and theater-strategic levels, objectives focus more on the intended purpose of the operation, not just the military action.”<sup>183</sup> Instead of statements of action, “these higher-order objectives are expressed as operational or strategic goals, conditions, or outcomes [effects], which describe the intended end-state from combatant commander’s perspective.”<sup>184</sup>

Within EBP, the term ‘effect’ has a broader meaning than the use at the tactical level. At the tactical level, effects tend to “describe the results of units’ actions and weapons employment.”<sup>185</sup> However, at the operational and theater-strategic level a “specified effect” describes a desired or undesired set of conditions, usually in the form of a behavioral state or capability within the PMESII systems of the operational environment, that result from the DIME instruments of power actions.<sup>186</sup> An effect is attainable, measurable, and capable of supporting multiple objectives. Instruments of power actions taken against key nodes can generate effects. Hence, effects are used to “bridge the gap between objectives [theater-strategic and operational] and tasks [operational and tactical].”<sup>187</sup>

In EBP, the planning process begins with the commander and his planners explaining objectives, acquiring systems knowledge of the operational environment, developing a

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<sup>181</sup> Ibid.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid., 12

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid., 12.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid.



commander's intent, and determining the set of effects required to achieve desired objectives.<sup>188</sup>

"They compare these effects with the PMESII systems' current states. Accurate identification of effects and associated follow-on actions requires active integration of all DIME instruments and participation of their subject-matter experts from the beginning of the planning process."<sup>189</sup>

Using the SoSA, "planners identify actions that, when executed against specified key nodes, should achieve the desired effects. Next, they couple the actions with specific resources or forces, completing an effects-nodes-actions-resources (E-N-A-R) linkage."<sup>190</sup> Understanding the various E-N-A-R linkage relationships enable planners to consider alternative courses of actions "that harmonize and sequence DIME actions against key nodes across time and space to accomplish desired effects."<sup>191</sup>

## EFFECTS-BASED EXECUTION (EBE)

The second major component of the EBO process is EBE. Understanding the capabilities and constraints of DIME instruments of powers and effectively integrating them during EBP results in the effective integration and utilization of DIME during EBE. In the military, the combatant commander and his staff match military tasks and actions to military forces and resources and harmonize these military actions with the actions of the other instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, and economic).<sup>192</sup> However, in achieving strategic objectives the military is sometimes not the preferred instrument of choice and its resources are used to support diplomatic, informational, and economic operations/activities.<sup>193</sup>

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<sup>188</sup> Ibid., 16

<sup>189</sup> Ibid., 12.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid.

<sup>191</sup> Ibid.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid.

In a military scenario of EBE, the Joint Force Commander's (JFC) staff identifies tasks and assigns responsibility for execution to forces through published orders.<sup>194</sup> These orders start the process of aligning forces with specific tasks in a prescribed timeframe.<sup>195</sup> During execution, the JFC and his staff constantly monitor and assess progress toward achieving the desired effects. "They redirect military actions as the situation requires, integrate alternate nonmilitary actions and reapportion resources in order to seize opportunities and mitigate shortfalls."<sup>196</sup> Crucial to successful effects attainment during EBE is the timing and sequencing of the DIME actions throughout the battlespace and it is the challenge and responsibility of the commander and his staff to ensure this happens.<sup>197</sup>

## EFFECTS-BASED ASSESSMENT (EBA)

The third and final major component of EBO is EBA. Effects-based assessment is essential because it "defines the measures of campaign success."<sup>198</sup> It expands on the current combat assessment process by focusing on the effects attained as well as tasks accomplished. An EBA improves current combat assessment in two ways: by using measures of performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness (MOE) to assess task accomplishment and effects attainment respectively; and by periodically performing overall campaign assessments.<sup>199</sup> Measures of performance focus on proper task accomplishment by both asking and answering the question: 'Was the task or action performed as the decision maker or commander intended?'<sup>200</sup> The question simply put in a military context is "Did the fires, maneuver, or information

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<sup>194</sup> The JFC's order to subordinates at the operational level specifies tasks, purpose, and associated effects for action by military components and agencies. At the tactical level the desired effects are reflected in the higher commander's intent statement.

<sup>195</sup> United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 7, 16.

<sup>196</sup> Ibid.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid.

<sup>199</sup> Ibid.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid.

accomplish the specified and implied tasks that were required?” The MOPs are very similar to the measures used in current battle damage assessment. Regardless of the effect obtained, their purpose is to find and measure the actual accomplishment of each specified and implied tasks; in order to assess whether the commander, his staff, and his units are “doing things right.”<sup>201</sup>

Measures of effectiveness focus on the effects attained through the execution of the specified and implied tasks. They determine the effect that the unit’s completed action has had in shaping the adversary’s behavior to what the commander desires.<sup>202</sup> It allows the commander and his staff to ask the question “Having done things right, are we doing the right thing?” The MOEs measure the changes in the PMESII system and to see if the changes are conforming in accordance with the commander’s intent.<sup>203</sup> This feedback allows the commander and his staff to make changes to the plan accordingly.

In other words, effects-based assessment uses MOPs and MOEs collectively to assess the state of current operations and discover trends that can potentially affect future operations.<sup>204</sup> Proper effects assessment drives subsequent battle staff planning and execution. Done properly it increases the overall efficiency and effectiveness of EBO. The final step of EBA is the overall campaign assessment. The overall campaign assessment compares the current effects assessment picture against the projected, desired plan and identifies the difference or “delta” between the two. Planners, decision makers, and commanders utilize the delta to assess where they are in accomplishing the overall campaign objectives and make necessary refinements to ensure that overall objectives are met.

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<sup>201</sup> Ibid.

<sup>202</sup> Ibid.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid., 1.

## SUMMARY

The effects-based operations methodology is very complex; however, its potential is unlimited. It provides a framework to maximize the power and effectiveness of America's instruments of national power through collaborative planning and synchronized execution. Although EBO is currently being employed by the military, its ability to be incorporated into the comprehensive national defense strategy is apparent. The nation will be well served fully embracing the EBO methodology.

## CHAPTER 4 - ANALYSIS

Effects-based Operations (EBO) has great potential to make a lasting impact on the United States defense strategy. Its framework, methodology, and processes encompass and integrate all the elements of national power into a cohesive and coherent effort to accomplish the specific policies of the President of the United States. Effects-based operations can be used by both military organizations—at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels—and nonmilitary organizations at various levels as well.

Within the military, EBO facilitates operations by providing commanders and planners with an effects-based approach and process that enables them to conduct full spectrum operations, accomplish a myriad of missions, and fulfill objectives in line with national policy aims. Is the current EBO methodology comprehensive enough to account for cultural factors in an insurgency? The answer is, no, because it lacks a common lexicon and problems inherent in interagency coordination.

Lexicon is defined in Merriam-Webster Dictionaries as

“1. a book containing an alphabetical arrangement of the words in a language and their definitions: DICTIONARY 2 a: the vocabulary of a language, an individual speaker or group of speakers, or a subject b: the total stock of morphemes in a

language” (Webster Online)<sup>205</sup> and “1 a dictionary, esp. of an ancient language  
2. the special vocabulary of a particular author, field of study, etc..<sup>206</sup>

Simply put, lexicon is the special vocabulary of a language or field of study; a book containing the words and their definitions; a dictionary.

The first reason EBO cannot comprehensively account for the cultural factors in an insurgency is its existing lexicon problem. A common lexicon enables people and organizations to have unity of effort and increases productivity. A lexicon accomplishes this by ensuring that everyone has a common understanding—a base—to work from so that the effort is well synchronized and in concert with the overall objectives. Unity of effort ensures that there is maximization of output and that everyone is working towards the same goal. Unity of effort also improves both small and large organizations alike. For example, in the military, doctrine assists in unifying the efforts of different organizations by ensuring that each unit, battalion, division, corps and service component has a common language that is understandable to each member of the organization and can be acted upon with certainty because of a “shared understanding.” Doctrine provides these organizations with a common picture and understanding of ideas through definitions of words and concepts. Doctrine is the military’s lexicon—its dictionary—to reference to understand words and assist in the unity of effort.

In many ways, EBO attempts to assist in the unity of effort process.<sup>207</sup> For instance, instead of dividing both effort and resources on a myriad of individual tasks and objectives, the EBO methodology maximizes unity of effort by identifying and focusing on the overall “effect” that needs to be achieved and utilizing all elements of national power to achieve that effect. By looking at the situation and adversary holistically, EBO facilitates collaboration, cooperation, and

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<sup>205</sup> *Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary* [online]; available from <http://www.m-w.com/dictionary.htm>; Internet: accessed 24 November 2004.

<sup>206</sup> *Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., 825.

<sup>207</sup> The collaborative information environment offers key decision-makers “the capacity to facilitate the creation of a shared situational awareness so that they can operate with the enhanced unity of effort as envisioned in the EBO concept.” *JWFC Pamphlet 7*, 9.

deconfliction among the elements of national power by ensuring that the various elements have a shared understanding of the situation, are able to synchronize their efforts, and synergistically work together to cause and produce an “effect” that supports the national policy aim. Effects-based operations will be the common language, the doctrine—the lexicon—that all elements of national power use to protect America from the current and future adversaries. Consequently, the only issue that EBO currently has is that the methodology and concept have no established common lexicon. This problem impacts the current utilization of EBO within DOD and hinders the future facilitation of EBO with other organizations.

Currently EBO does not have a dictionary or a common book of terms to reference a concise list of accepted definitions of terms used in its methodology. Many of DOD’s doctrinal publications either do not possess the definitions for key EBO terms or the definitions differ. Neither the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication 1-02)* nor the *Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia* provide a definition for the words “effects” or “effects-based operations” (EBO).<sup>208</sup> The Joint Vision Lexicon website, whose purpose is to highlight the most common and current lexicon in joint doctrine and “standardize terminology for use in concept development,” also fails to provide definitions for EBO or its major components—effects-based planning (EBP), effects-based execution (EBE), or effects-based assessment (EBA).<sup>209</sup>

Differing definitions of key EBO terminology in the DOD hampers the overall understanding of the EBO methodology and the unity of effort required to bring the EBO concept fully into fruition. Inside DOD, several of the leading offices and organizations entrusted with military transformation, joint doctrine development, and concept development differ in defining

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<sup>208</sup> These publications were accessed online as of 14 Dec 04. They were last updated Oct 04.

<sup>209</sup> Joint Vision, <http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/lexicon.htm>, accessed on 13 Dec 04.

EBO and its key terms.<sup>210</sup> These varying definitions are even found inside the various offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

In *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach*, the Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, writes

“EBO is **primarily** about **focusing** knowledge, precision, speed, and agility **on the enemy decision-makers to degrade** their ability to take coherent action rather than conducting combat operations on more efficient destruction of the enemy.”<sup>211</sup>

“EBO is a **way of thinking or a methodology** for planning, executing, and assessing operations designed to attain specific effects that are required to achieve desired national security outcomes.”<sup>212</sup>

In *Effects-based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War*, Edward Smith, writing under the auspices of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence (OASD C3I) states

“Effects-based operations are coordinated sets of **actions directed at shaping the behavior of friends, foes, neutrals in peace, crisis, and war**”<sup>213</sup>

“Effects-based operations can be described as operations in the cognitive domain because that is where human beings react to stimuli, come to an understanding of a situation, and decide on a response.”<sup>214</sup>

The differences in the definitions are quite noticeable. The focus of the Office of Transformation’s EBO definition is the adversary. Its definition looks at achieving national policy aims through the degradation or destruction of the enemy. This same information paper

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<sup>210</sup> Part of USJFCOM mission is to test new concepts and developing joint doctrine for the current fighting force. The Command and Control Research Program (CCRP) mission is to understand the national security implications of the Information Age to DOD. The Airpower Research Institute of Air University’s College of Aerospace, Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE) promotes the understanding of air and space power theory and its application for the USAF, other service components and DOD.

<sup>211</sup> US Department of Defense, *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach*, 34.

<sup>212</sup> Ibid.

<sup>213</sup> Smith, xiv.

<sup>214</sup> Smith, xv.

states that “the powerful combination of network-centric capabilities in the form of an effects based approach to planning and execution will provide U.S. forces with the potential to achieve the desired effects on the enemy’s behavior”<sup>215</sup> and that “the combination of network-centric capabilities and an effects-based approach provides the U.S. commanders and planners with a new potential for attacking the elements of the enemy’s will directly, thereby avoiding or at least diminishing, our reliance on sheer physical destruction.”<sup>216</sup> The Office of Transformation sees the primary use of EBO is to aid commanders, planners, and soldiers to deal with the adversary in order to fulfill the President’s national objectives. However, what about peacetime operations? The military is charged with conducting full-spectrum operations which include stability operations. The way the military views and treats people in stability operations can directly impact the success of those operations. In peace keeping, peace enforcement, or humanitarian assistance missions classifying and viewing all actors in a country as an enemy would be detrimental to the planning and execution of the mission and possibly result in the national policy objectives not being met.<sup>217</sup>

The EBO methodology relies on a shared and common understanding to facilitate unity of effort during the operation. For instance, in a disaster relief mission, the military viewing all the inhabitants of a country as “enemy decision makers” may conflict with the view of the people held by several nongovernmental agencies assisting in the relief effort. This conflict of viewpoints could negatively affect the effective planning and execution of the mission. Similarly, military forces assisting another country’s counterinsurgency effort could face difficulty if they viewed every person within that populace as an adversary or enemy decision maker. Doing so could alienate the local populace, offend their foreign government hosts/sponsors, and jeopardize the mission of defeating the insurgency.

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<sup>215</sup> US Department of Defense, *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach*, 34.

<sup>216</sup> Ibid.

<sup>217</sup> FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, 2-3.



Conversely, OASD C3I's definition of EBO has merit because it is more expansive than the Transformation Office's definition. By defining EBO as "coordinated actions directed at shaping the behavior of friends, foes, neutrals in peace, war, and crisis," OASD C3I provides latitude and flexibility to view and assess all actors in an operational environment and treat them accordingly. Unlike the Office of Transformation's definition which is enemy systems based and mainly restricted to combat operations, OASD C3I's definition is broader, encompassing all the actors in its environment, holistic in its understanding of its environment and flexible enough to be used in full spectrum operations.

The United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), entrusted with both developing joint doctrine for utilization by all of the US Armed Forces and educating senior service leadership on the best way to implement the doctrine, also has differing definitions of EBO than those of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.<sup>218</sup> Even more disturbing, USJFCOM has differing definitions of EBO and its associated terms within its own organization. The most common differences are found in USJFCOM's *Joint Forces Command Glossary* and several *Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlets*. The definitional differences are highlighted below in boldface and underlined while the similarities are boldfaced and italicized. The United States Joint Forces Command defines EBO as:

Effects Based Operations (EBO) – "**a process** for obtaining a desired *strategic outcome* or "effect" on **the enemy**, through the synergistic, multiplicative, and cumulative *application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities* at the tactical, operational and strategic levels." (*Joint Forces Command Glossary*)<sup>219</sup>

EBO— "**actions** that **change the state of a system** to *achieve directed policy aims* using the integrated application of the *diplomatic, informational, military,*

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<sup>218</sup> United States Joint Forces Command, <http://www.jfcom.mil/about/about1.htm>, accessed 4 December 2004.

<sup>219</sup> *The Joint Forces Command Glossary*, <http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm>, accessed 27 October 2004.

*and economic (DIME) instruments of power.” (Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 4)*<sup>220</sup>

Effects-based operations (EBO)—“operations that are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted based on a holistic understanding of the *operational environment* in order to influence or change system behavior or capabilities using the integrated application of selected *instruments of power* to *achieve directed policy aims*.” (Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 7, terms and definitions)<sup>221</sup>

The differences and similarities of the above definitions can best be identified by viewing the definitions in terms of ways, means, and ends.<sup>222</sup> These EBO definitions are similar in describing the means and the ends of EBO. The definitions’ ends are to achieve a national level objective. “Directed policy aims” and “strategic outcome” both refer to a national level objective set out by the President, which is relevant to an operation at hand.<sup>223</sup> The definitions’ “instruments of power” and “full range of military and non-military capabilities” both refer to the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic national resources available to decision makers to achieve the national objective. The ways in which EBO, however, achieves the strategic objective is where the definitions differ greatly. The first definition is an enemy based “process”. By limiting its methods and options of achieving the national objective to the enemy, it restricts the flexibility and comprehensiveness of the EBO methodology to be used as a tool for national strategy. On the other hand, the other two definitions look at achieving the national objective by “changing the state of the system.” A “system” is a “functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of elements that interact together as a whole” which are neither exclusively friendly nor hostile.<sup>224</sup> They can be almost anything—individuals, inanimate objects, a group of people,

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<sup>220</sup> United States Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 4*, 4.

<sup>221</sup> United States Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 7*, “Terms and Definitions”.

<sup>222</sup> “Ways” are options/methods, “means” are resources, and “ends” represent goals or objectives.

<sup>223</sup> United States Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 7*, 2.

<sup>224</sup> Ibid.

or a nation. By focusing on changing a “system” instead of an “enemy” the second and third definitions of EBO enable the methodology to be used in a national security strategy.

Similar to the EBO definitions, USJFCOM’s definitions of operational net assessment (ONA) differ too. United States Joint Forces Command defines ONA as:

Operational Net Assessment (ONA)—A continuously updated operational support tool that provides a JTF commander visibility of effects-to-task linkages based on a "system-of-systems" analysis of a potential **adversary's** political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) **war-making capabilities**. The ONA informs decision-makers from strategic to tactical levels regarding the complementary effects and supporting missions and tasks that can be considered when applying the full range of diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) actions to **achieve specific effects on an adversary's will and capability** in support of national objectives. ONA is a critical enabler for achieving rapid decisive operations. It is an *integrated, collaborative* product of Department of Defense and other appropriate *government and non-government organizations*. **Its purpose is to identify key links and nodes within the adversary's systems and to propose methods that will influence, neutralize or destroy them and achieve a desired effect or outcome.** (*Joint Forces Command Glossary*)<sup>225</sup>

Operational net assessment (ONA)—“The integration of people, processes, and tools that use multiple information sources and collaborative **analysis to build shared knowledge of the adversary, the environment, and ourselves.** (*Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 4* and *Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 7*)<sup>226</sup>

The ONA definitions are similar in the respect that they both describe ONA as an integrated, collaborative process that incorporates various sources throughout the government to develop a picture of the environment. The major difference, however, between the ONA definitions is that one is a holistic picture of the entire operational environment and its actors, while the other picture is limited to the adversary and focuses solely on destroying, neutralizing, or influencing the adversary’s will, war making capabilities, and key nodal links. The difference is all in the focus.

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<sup>225</sup> *The Joint Forces Command Glossary*, <http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm>, accessed 27 October 2004.

<sup>226</sup> United States Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 4*, GL-3 and United States Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 7*, “Terms and Definitions.”

Other differences in EBO's definitions and terms are not limited to just the specific books, pamphlets, and articles previously mentioned. The *Revised First Draft of Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations* and the United States Air University College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE)<sup>227</sup>—the primary proponent for Air Force doctrine, both have various definitions of EBO terms that differ from those from the offices of the DOD and USJFCOM.<sup>228</sup>

These differences in definitions plainly show that there is a lexicon problem associated with the EBO methodology. For the concept of EBO to be fully realized it has to be accepted and used by nonmilitary organizations as well. These organizations perception of the environment and its actors have a great impact on the military's collaboration with them and to the overall success of the mission. The "shared awareness" that EBO prides itself on must be "shared" by all other organizations within the instruments of power to be truly effective.

The strength of EBO is the unity of effort it provides by utilizing all elements of national power—diplomatic, information, military, and economic—to achieve desired national effects. The US Joint Warfighting Center states, "It is essential to understand terms unique to the EBO construct" and that the "EBO-specific terminology is intended to support an integrated approach to current decision-making processes."<sup>229</sup> The lack of common lexicon within DOD, however, prevents the maximization of effort within DOD and seamless collaboration between the interagency organizations. If organizations within DOD have EBO lexicon problems it is imprudent to think that other national interagency organizations will not. The Department of

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<sup>227</sup> The Air Force was one of the leading services to practice EBO. The CJFACC practiced EBO during its air campaign during Operation DESERT STORM. CADRE Paper No.15: *Thinking Effects: Effects-Based Operations for Joint Operations*, promotes the understanding of air and space theory and applications to be used by the US Air Force, DOD, other governmental agencies, and public policy institutions.

<sup>228</sup> On page 97 of *CADRE Paper No 15*. EBO is defined as "actions taken against enemy systems designed to achieve specific effects that contribute directly to desired military and political outcomes." On page III-7 of the *Revised Final Draft of JP 3-0* defines "effect" as "a consequence (physical and/or behavioral) brought about by an action."

<sup>229</sup> United States Joint Forces Command, *Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 7*, ?.

Defense, the Department of State, and other interagency organization already have distinct unique cultures within their organizations that have impeded true collaboration and progress in the past.<sup>230</sup> Employing a new methodology with lexicon issues would just exacerbate the problems and differences in the future. It is imperative that DOD develops a common lexicon for EBO that can be used within and between the various organizations to facilitate unity of effort in the defense of the nation.

The second reason that the EBO methodology is not comprehensive enough to account for the cultural factors in insurgency is due to the interagency coordination problems. *Joint Publication 1-02 Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* defines interagency coordination as:

“Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of the Department of Defense and engaged US Government agencies, governmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective.”<sup>231</sup>

As the second judgment criteria for this paper the above definition for interagency coordination will be used.

One of the biggest challenges with interagency coordination and operations is achieving unity of effort amongst the different organizations. *Joint Vision 2020* states

“The primary challenge of interagency operations is to achieve unity of effort despite the diverse cultures, competing interests, and differing priorities of the participating organizations, many of whom guard the relative independence, freedom of action, and impartiality. Additionally these organizations may lack the structure and resources to support extensive liaison cells or integrative technology.”<sup>232</sup>

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<sup>230</sup> *The 9/11 Commission Report*. These collaboration issues are explained in depth in *The 9/11 Commission Report*. The various intelligence agencies inability to effectively collaborate and share information resulted in “seams” that were exploited by Al-Qaida terrorists.

<sup>231</sup> US Department of Defense, *Joint Vision 2020* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2000), 24. *Joint Vision 2020* is the CJCS’ vision for transforming the joint force to achieve full spectrum dominance.

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.*

Operation RESTORE HOPE in Haiti is a good example of complications in interagency planning. The interagency planning for the operations in Haiti were described by the major participants as slow, disjointed, and lacking political guidance.<sup>233</sup> The poor coordination was due to “process and security restrictions [which] resulted in considerable frustration at the operational level where military planners found themselves preparing for civil-military operations without being able to talk to their civilian counterparts.”<sup>234</sup>

Prior to the operations in Haiti there were numerous differences of opinion among the interagency leaders how the international crisis should be handled. The National Security Council (NSC) favored the use of force; however, DOD civilian leadership remained negative toward the use of force, while the Department of State pondered a diplomatic solution.<sup>235</sup> These differences of opinions resulted in frustration and a lack of parallel and coordinated planning among these various organizations. Even the United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) planners “knew they needed to coordinate with civilian agencies, but were precluded from doing so by security concerns.”<sup>236</sup> By the time the interagency organizations did resolve their differences and start planning the process was still disorganized and painful. One senior player in the planning process noted, “We tried to do the inter-agency coordination...but it was a disaster...People just recited what they were doing,” yet “there was no real candor and coordination taking place”<sup>237</sup> while a senior military officer remarked, ““This is the kind of planning that gets people killed.”<sup>238</sup>

These problems common to interagency coordination definitely hampers EBO’s ability to account for cultural factors in an insurgency. Understanding the intricacies of a population or the

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<sup>233</sup> Margaret Daly Hays and RADM Gary F. Weatley (Ret), *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti—A Case Study*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, February 1996, 1.

<sup>234</sup> Ibid, 2.

<sup>235</sup> Ibid, 2.

<sup>236</sup> Ibid, 2.

<sup>237</sup> Ibid, 2.

<sup>238</sup> Ibid, 2.

human dimension of the environment requires subject matter experts (SMEs) and correspondence from the various centers of excellence (COEs) to comprehend.<sup>239</sup> The DOD has admitted that one of its greatest shortfalls in EBO is its lack of SMEs. Therefore the requisite knowledge needed to conduct effective ONAs come from outside sources through the process of interagency coordination. The inherent problems in the interagency coordination process both negatively affect and currently limit the ability to leverage the full potential of EBO against insurgency today.

Effects-based operations have tremendous potential to impact the way the United States conduct operations in both peace and wartime. The synergistic power that is generated through the complete collaboration and coordination of the instruments of power is intimidating. However, the lack of a common lexicon and the problems associated with interagency coordination prevent EBO's potential from being fully realized.

## **CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **CONCLUSIONS**

Effects-based operations have tremendous potential to be used as a key tool in the defense of the United States. However, its lack of a common lexicon and interagency coordination problems currently hamper its full effectiveness as a tool in fighting insurgencies. Both problems hinder the effective interagency collaboration necessary to get the holistic understanding of the adversary, the environment, and ourselves necessary for the conduct of successful effects-based operations. Additionally, insurgency conflict is a complicated, violent form of warfare in which cultural understanding is an important factor in determining its success

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<sup>239</sup> Centers of Excellence (COE) represent agencies that have been recognized for their expertise and excellence in a specific area or several areas of research and study

or failure. Therefore, the United States must fully understand and solve the lexicon and interagency coordination issues resident in its own EBO methodology before it can be successfully employed against the insurgents.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

To maximize the potential of EBO a common lexicon has to be established. Instead of having varying definitions of key EBO terms, DOD and USJFCOM need to collaborate and establish key terms for the EBO construct. Both DOD and USJFCOM need to speak with one voice. Proper collaboration and vetting of definitions and concepts should be done between the two before information is put out to the general public. This collaboration and vetting process should be a concerted effort done as quickly as possible. Establishing a website which provides the latest definitions and terms for EBO would be very helpful. To wait and withhold the latest information concerning EBO is unwise because it potentially causes those at the strategic level (DOD proper and USJFCOM) to operate in disjunction with the tactical units in the field currently employing the EBO concept in combat operations. Already tasked with taking the lead for the development of the EBO construct for all the services, USJFCOM should also provide a central website in which the latest developments concerning EBO are examined and then posted. Any developments that occur in the DOD's Office of Transformation and other research centers concerning EBO should first go through USJFCOM, then consolidated, deconflicted, and posted on the central website.

A forcing function to ensure or start the process for more effective interagency coordination would be for Congress to legislate a second Goldwater-Nichols Act. The first Goldwater-Nichols Act, established after the operation in Grenada, mandated that the different military service components within DOD tear down parochial walls and develop doctrine and



procedures to work together and maximize the power of the U.S. Armed Forces.<sup>240</sup> Likewise, in the wake of the 9/11 intelligence failure, a new Goldwaters-Nichols Act needs to be legislated that tears down the walls and barriers that exist between various organizations in the interagency community in order to maximize the collaborative force of the national instruments of power working in concert.<sup>241</sup>

For effects-based operations to be effective the interagency community has to speak with one voice. First, DOD has to consolidate the information and distribute it to be utilized by units and forces in contact with the adversary. Next, interagency organizations need a full understanding of the EBO methodology and how it works to fulfill the national security strategy. The DOD, NSC, and other interagency organizations must be educated on the lexicon and concept of EBO in order to understand how they each play a part in accomplishing the national policy aims. All agencies must be educated on the effects-based process and effects-based planning in order to understand how it facilitates meeting national security objectives. The United States needs to introduce and incorporate both the effects-based process and planning as part of the National Security Strategy. Effects-based operations cannot be viewed or treated as strictly a DOD construct.<sup>242</sup> To truly be effective, the EBO methodology must be understood, accepted, and utilized at the highest strategic level.

Lastly, for EBO to fully utilize all elements of national power to achieve national policy aims it is imperative for the highest-level of strategic decision makers to understand and utilize this methodology. The goals, objectives, or endstate put forth by the country's most senior decision maker shapes the overall planning and execution of the campaign, and puts in motion

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<sup>240</sup> Michael S. Hopkins, "Transforming For New Military Demands," *Military Review*, May–June 2004. Also available online at [http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m0PBZ/is\\_2004\\_May-June/ai\\_n6123965](http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_2004_May-June/ai_n6123965).

<sup>241</sup> *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 1-50.

<sup>242</sup> "Applying the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) instruments of national power in a coherent manner requires capabilities beyond those in the Department of Defense. These capabilities reside in other departments and agencies of the government—representing the other instruments of national power—that have not historically fused their efforts into coherent interagency operations." *Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 7*, 4.

actions which have both cumulative and cascading effects that cannot be undone. Therefore the President's national policy aims and political objectives must be clearly outlined and a clear endstate must be defined to truly maximize the effectiveness of the EBO methodology.

The EBO methodology holds a lot of promise and shows marvelous potential as a tool to aid in the defense of the nation. Effects-based operations concept of using all elements of national power to create desired outcomes to accomplish national policy aims is brilliant; however, the lack of a common lexicon and interagency coordination problems greatly hinders its effectiveness in the fight against insurgency and its full implementation as a part of the nation's defense strategy.

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